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ABSTRACT
The paper focuses on the reception of Priestley in Germany, which is
remarkable for the huge and assiduous interest it raised in different
philosophical milieus. Priestley’s dynamical conception of matter,
his explanation of the functioning of the brain, and of the
production of material ideas are at the basis of the new form of
materialism that develops in Germany in the late 1770s, and
which differs completely from the model of mechanical
materialism Germany was used to in earlier decades. Indeed, the
German reception of Priestley’s ideas begins surprisingly early, just
one year after the publication of his edition of Hartley’s
Observations on Man (1775), and traverses the two final decades
of the eighteenth century with a considerable number of reviews
and references in the main philosophical journals and works of
the time. In 1778, his introduction to the Observations was
translated into German and presented in the form of a manifesto
of a new materialistic philosophy compatible with the claims of
morals and religion. Within a few years, Priestley became the
unavoidable reference point for the most relevant theological and
philosophical discussions concerning the nature of matter and
spirits, the place of God, the possibility of human freedom, and
the legitimacy of free thinking.
KEYWORDS
materialism; philosophical
necessity; vindication of
Christianity
Dealing with the presence of Joseph Priestley in eighteenth-century Germany can be a very
challenging task. The broad spectrum of Priestley’s intellectual engagement is mirrored in
the variety of paths through which his ideas reached the German world. In the present
paper, I will not take into account the reception of his scientific investigations, which
was remarkable and influential.1 I will focus instead on the disseminations of his philoso-
phical and theological ideas, in order to better understand what it meant to refer to Priest-
ley at the time. The question that has driven my investigation concerns the “image” of
Priestley that became current in the German philosophical milieu during the eighteenth
century, the “image” that, for instance, Kant and Tetens must have had in mind when
they took him as a very precise reference point in the philosophical debate. As the transfer
of ideas at that time was mainly dependent upon the abilities of translators and the choices
of the reviews, I have preferred to focus on those sources in order to understand which
features of Priestley’s work were promoted or criticized, or simply judged relevant to
the German debate of the time. Following this line, I have left aside the investigation of
the more-or-less manifest presence of Priestley’s ideas in the main philosophical
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systems of the time, such as Kant’s, Tetens’, or of the German empiricists in Göttingen; an
investigation at least partially undertaken by recent scholars,2 in relation to which the
present research aims at offering a sort of historical prolegomenon.
1. A retrospective look: Priestley between Germany and Britain
The massive presence of Joseph Priestley in the German cultural debate of the late eight-
eenth century can be easily perceived by leafing throughone of themost successfulGeschich-
ten der Philosophie published in Göttingen in the very first years of the following century, in
which the author devotes special attention to the role the British thinker played in the main
philosophical disputes that were going on at the time inside and outside Germany. In the
fifth volume of his monumentalGeschichte der neueren Philosophie seit der Epoche derWie-
derherstellung derWissenschaften (1804),3 Johann Gottlieb Buhle –who can be legitimately
considered themain representative of the philosophical historiography inGöttingen, in line
with JohannGottfried Eichorn’s decision to put him at the head of the philosophical section
of his ambitious project of an omnicomprehensiveGeschichte der Künste undWissenschaf-
ten in eleven volumes (1796) – places Priestley at the center of a more than 100-page-long
presentation of the current British philosophical debate, the one on materialism and deter-
minism, which plays a key role even within the national borders of the German world.4 In
fact, according to Buhle’s insightful presentation, British philosophy turns out to be doubly
intertwined with German culture: on the one hand, it enabled a progression in the philoso-
phical debate that Germany, still anchored to the old and dusty approach of Wolffian phil-
osophy, was unable to carry on by itself; and, on the other, it raised new problems, the
solution to which would only be found in the later “revolution in thinking” promoted by
Immanuel Kant.5 Buhle’s scheme belongs undoubtedly to the clear teleological orientation
of his historiographical reconstruction; Buhle being in fact one of the “three Bs” of the
Kantian front in Göttingen.6 The teleological approach, however, doesn’t prevent him
from identifying clearly the reasons and the outcome of the massive attention Germany
devoted to Priestley in the last three decades of the eighteenth century.
Buhle sees precisely at the core of the philosophical debate of the modern era the issues
of materialism and determinism, which involve in their development much broader phi-
losophical questions. While, dealing with that debate, eighteenth-century German philos-
ophy got stuck in the opposition between an irreligious and even atheistic fatalism and the
defense of free will as the basis of any moral and religious concern, in Britain the discus-
sion seemed to have moved a step further, by introducing an idea of materialism and phi-
losophical necessity, which claimed to be compatible with the main issues of morals and
Christianity. According to Buhle, this improvement had both a cultural and political
origin; indeed, it was promoted by the firm demand for the freedom of thought (Geistes-
freiheit) which Britain carried on through its internal political conflicts, and which, at the
end, was officially acknowledged and legitimated by the public law. Differently from
France, where the battle in favor of the freedom of thought was animated exclusively by
a “vivid hatred against the despotism of the government and the spiritual authority”, “pas-
sionately directed toward the opposite extreme”, and reached its goal as a mere “fruit of
mood, wit, and mischief” (Frucht der Laune, des Witzes, des Muthwillens), Britain was
driven by a “cultural” ideal, that is by the “pure concern for truth” which should
animate every philosophical inquiry.7
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Those circumstances allowed British thinkers to develop a form of materialism and
determinism which didn’t lead necessarily to the “opposite extreme”, i.e. to the highly
feared form of fatalism that subverts the principles of morality and leads to reject both
natural and revealed religion as such. Buhle assigns Joseph Priestley a key role in this
process; indeed, by incarnating the very idea of a free thinker, he distanced himself
from the British philosophical mainstreams of his time. He defended, on the one hand,
“the rights of natural religion against Hume” and, on the other, “the rights of philosophical
reason” against the Scottish supporters of common sense philosophy, namely Reid,
Beattie, and Oswald.8
Following his conviction about Priestley’s pivotal role in the discussion outside and
inside Germany, Buhle introduces in his work a very detailed presentation of his materi-
alism and necessitarianism, with the clear aim to pinpoint their compatibility with the
claims of moral responsibility, with the rational proof of God’s existence, and in general
with the truths of Christianity. Actually, Buhle was not completely wrong in judging
that the German Republic of Letters had been trapped for quite a long time in a still
inadequate idea of materialism. The glorious season of the German struggle against mate-
rialism that moved uninterruptedly from the mid-1720s – the time of the conflict between
Christian Wolff and the theologians in Halle and Jena9 – to the late 1750s – the time of the
most massive French “hegemony” at the Prussian court – was entirely dominated by the
same idea of materialism introduced in Germany by Leibniz through the mediation of
Wolff, and immediately taken over and somehow “canonized” by the main philosophical
lexica of the time.10 According to that idea, materialism was identified with that kind of
monistic metaphysics supported by ancient atomists, like Democritus and Epicurus,
and in modern times by Hobbes and even Spinoza.11 It was in the end – at least in the
very influential image Wolff had provided in his German Metaphysics – a kind of
“mutilation” of Descartes’ dualism, with which it shared the same notion of matter as a
merely passive substance, ruled by mechanical laws. This short-sighted perspective
helps to understand, for instance, the reason why German philosophy did not manage
to grasp the peculiarity of the newest form of “non-mechanical” materialism – such as
La Mettrie’s – which relied on a different concept of matter, now endowed in its organiz-
ation with immanent active forces.12
By the time Buhle was working on his historiographical overview the situation had
changed and, primarily thanks to Priestley’s work, Germany seemed to have abandoned
the historical and theoretical bias toward materialism that for so many decades had
worked as a distorting filter in the understanding of this philosophical issue. Indeed,
Priestley had developed his philosophical system on the basis of a different idea of
matter in order to pass safely between the Scylla and Charybdis of an atheistic materialism
and a pious but inconsistent immaterialism. That is why, in the Disquisitions relating to
Matter and Spirit (1777), he openly rejects what Buhle in 1803 still presents as “the
common opinion about matter” – a solid, impenetrable, and inert substance – and replaces
it with a notion that includes in it peculiar powers, such as “the reciprocal attraction and
repulsion of all its parts”.13 By showing that the organization of matter can produce sen-
sation and thought by itself, without the intervention of any alleged spiritual being, Priest-
ley argues for a new form of psychological materialism, by means of which he manages – at
least in Buhle’s view – to reach a twofold goal. Firstly, he develops an idea of human being
as a “uniform composition”14 that eludes the many difficulties implied by every dualistic
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conception of human nature, among which are of course the many artificial attempts phi-
losophers have made in order to explain how those completely heterogeneous substances
could reciprocally interact, and to make understandable the almost incomprehensible
descriptions of the condition of the soul before the birth of the body or between the cor-
poreal death and the final resurrection.15 By doing so, as Buhle promptly remarks, Priest-
ley shows that materialism is the most “easy and suitable” way to understand human
nature as we experience it.16 Secondly, he provides Christian religion with a metaphysical
system that reinforces its fundamental truths and removes the doctrinal corruptions ori-
ginated from its pagan contaminations, such as the belief in the immortality of the soul.17
In fact, this belief, which cannot be supported by rational proof and even less by means of
empirical observation, finds reliable ground only in the teachings of Christian revelation,
and in particular in the doctrine of resurrection.
Buhle considers this twofold goal Priestley’s most important contribution to the way out
from a debate that had somehow paralyzed German philosophy. By unveiling the
“ungrounded prejudice against materialism”18 that identifies it with atheism and irreligion,
Priestley has promoted a newmetaphysics capable of safeguarding the claims of Christian-
ity. Indeed, by combining his psychological materialism with a sort of cautious and modest
epistemic attitude that clearly derives from his Lockean background, Priestley rejects the
analogy between human and divine nature in favor of the acceptance of a highest essential
difference between them.19 The materialistic conception of human beings does not necess-
arily imply a form of “general” materialism that involves a materialistic idea of God. In
Buhle’s words: “God is and always has to be unconceivable (unbegreiflich) to us”;
what we worship in God are the properties of the highest wisdom, the omnipotence, the
infinite goodness, the prescience that dominates everything. Whatever the nature of the
being with those properties might be, he must be equally worthy, we might call him material
or immaterial.20
According to Locke’s methodological caveat, Priestley argues that, even if one can provide
a valid rational demonstration of God’s existence, his ultimate nature remains, like every
real essence, beyond the boundaries of human knowledge.
The boundaries of human knowledge open the space for Revelation, which can teach
what reason cannot reach by its own means, and this is precisely how it works with the
second cornerstone of religion, usually considered under the menace of materialism;
that is, the belief in the immortality of the soul. Such a belief, which Priestley considers
as an important support for but not a necessary ground of moral agency, cannot be coher-
ently proved either rationally or empirically; any attempt to preserve a special realm for
the soul, the activity of which is clearly connected to the structure and disposition of
our brain, cannot but fail. The soul ceases with the corruption of the physical body. But
it is precisely in this very point that Priestley’s materialism reveals its unexpected potenti-
ality, i.e. its perfect harmonization with Christian faith. By announcing the final resurrec-
tion, Revelation is therefore presented by Priestley as the only means in support of our
hope for a future life, which prevents the contradictions of a dualistic metaphysics.
That is why deists, like Priestley’s friend and political ally Thomas Paine, in their rejection
of positive religion find themselves compelled to admit in a very inconsistent way the
immortality of the soul; hence, they fail in their apology for religion and come close to
atheism.21
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In his appreciative presentation, Buhle cannot refrain from noting the philosophical
weakness of Priestley’s argument in favor of materialism, which paradoxically would be
agreeable for Christians, but not for the supporters of natural religion.
[Priestley] unquestionably deserves credit for having better brought to light the connection
between the Christian revealed doctrine of resurrection and the philosophical concepts of
human immaterial souls […]. Materialism seems to be better suited to the doctrine of resur-
rection than spiritualism, even if Priestley seems to go too far and to be run over by his own
mistake when he considers the same (Christian) doctrine and the holy authors as materialists,
interpreting any passage of the Bible that concerns the soul in favor of materialism. In fact,
only by means of Christian positive theology materialism can be made more agreeable, that is
insofar it grounds the doctrine of resurrection; [but] philosophers who rest their arguments
on the sole basis of reason and experience won’t benefit at all from that system.22
2. Priestley’s agreeable materialism
In fact, Buhle detects at the origin of Priestley’s philosophical project a kind of “prejudice
in favor of religion”; a prejudice that might have made him more warmly welcomed in late
eighteenth-century Germany. This consideration weakens, on the one hand, Priestley’s
strictly philosophical coherence but reinforces, on the other, the image of Priestley as
“apologist for Christianity”, which today is overwhelmingly recognized as the fundamental
feature of his intellectual engagement,23 and which undoubtedly represents the dominant
aspect in his reception on German soil.
In this context, there is at least a very interesting historical circumstance which deserves
to be mentioned. It concerns the fate of a philosophical work strictly connected to Priest-
ley’s intellectual activity, namely David Hartley’s Observations on Man, his Frame, his
Duty, and his Expectations (1749), which is notoriously the work that awakened, in
around 1770, Priestley’s interest in the materialistic explanation of human nature, and
the revised edition of which made him famous in the philosophical world. Hartley’sObser-
vations were promptly discussed and translated outside England, very early in France
(1755),24 and a bit later in Germany (1772–1773). The way the work was introduced
into the two countries is extremely meaningful in order to understand the attitude of
those respective cultures toward such a ground-breaking image of the working of the
mind, and of human nature in general. In fact, the two heterogeneous parts of Hartley’s
work matched perfectly the theological and scientific inclinations of the German and
French intellectual worlds, so that – as reported by Friedrich Lange in his influential
History of Materialism – “the German [translator] holds the theological portion to be
the most important, and gives only a concise sketch of the theory of associations,
[while] the French translator confines himself to the physiological explanation, and
leaves the theological out”.25 While the French Explication physique des sens, des idées,
et des mouvemens, tant volontaires qu’involontaires, published by the abbot Henri
Jurain, was dedicated to Buffon, the German translation was dedicated to Johann
Joachim Spalding, whose Bestimmung des Menschen (1748) had formulated, in the very
same years of Hartley’s work, the new direction of the German trends in philosophy
and theology, in particular against the materialistic position promoted by La Mettrie’s
Homme-machine just one year before.
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In fact, Spalding was the one who had called the attention of his younger friend
Hermann Andreas Pistorius (1730–1798) to Hartley’s work, promoting the idea of a
German translation of the text. Pistorius – a rather obscure though interesting parish
priest, well acquainted with English philosophy, and today merely known as an insightful
opponent of Kantianism – committed the translation to a certain Magister von Spieren, a
preacher in Samtens, keeping for himself the task to revise and integrate the text with
annotations and additions.26 The two-volume work came out in 1772–1773 with the
title David Hartleys Betrachtungen über den Menschen, seine Natur, seine Pflicht und
Erwartungen; Pistorius’ notes concern only the ethical and religious part of the work,
while the mechanistically psychological part is reduced to a really basic presentation.27
The importance of such a text was, in Pistorius’ eyes, the successful attempt “to put the
doctrine of necessity – a high contested doctrine because of its alleged inconsistency
with morality and religion – at the basis of theoretical and practical religion, and of
human hopes”, providing a “new proof of the truth of Christian faith”.28 Hartley, who Pis-
torius knew was suspected malgré lui to be a materialist and who was not always properly
cautious in expressing his opinion, had to be made available to the German Republic of
Letters.29 The translation was very positively reviewed the year after in the Allgemeine
deutsche Bibliothek by G.E. Schmidt, who didn’t hesitate to declare that the importance
of the work for the German world had to be seen in Pistorius’ annotations, by means of
which he managed to remove any suspicion of materialism and irreligion from Hartley’s
theory of human nature.30
Hartley might have been the first contact between Pistorius and Priestley, as Pistorius
had probably been informed pretty early of the fact that the work he had just translated
and accurately annotated had been reprinted in a very revised edition by someone who
was stressing precisely those claims in the text that Pistorius had denounced as not
sufficiently “cautious” in their winking at materialism. Priestley’s edition came out in
England in 1775; in 1776 it was reviewed by the Göttingen professor Christoph
Meiners (1747–1810) in the Göttingische Anzeigen and by an anonymous reviewer in
the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeige.31 With this new edition, the focus on Hartley’s work
changed radically; Priestley had notoriously included a very well-focused selection in
the material he was editing, putting at the very center of his introductory essays Hartley’s
mechanism of the soul and its physiological basis, and the theory of vibrations that allows
a proper explanation of the transmission of sense data to the brain and their elaboration.
Such a physiological materialism didn’t lack opponents, even from the side of the phys-
icians, among which Johann Heinrich Albert Reimarus, the son of the famous theologian,
raised his voice against Priestley’s claim of a “material faculty of representations” by recal-
ling arguments already discussed in Tetens’ Philosophische Versuche.32 In contrast with
such a critical approach, both reviewers of Priestley’s edition agree in moving into the fore-
ground the image of Hartley as a “Newton in psychology”,33 explicitly suggested in the first
introductory essay. To stress the tight connection between Hartley and Newton rep-
resented a very efficacious strategic choice, which, in mid-1770s Germany, was clearly
understandable as lining up with the new philosophical and scientific trend promoting
empiricism instead of dogmatism, observation instead of deductive reason, and experi-
mentalism instead of rational metaphysics. That was precisely the position of Meiners,
whose programmatic Revision der Philosophie, published just a few years earlier (1772),
represented in Germany the clearest manifesto for the campaign in favor of an empirical
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approach in philosophy clearly inspired by Locke, and an attack against the claims of
deductive metaphysics. Promoting Priestley’s philosophical interpretation of Hartley’s
physiology meant explicitly to be positioned alongside Locke and Newton against the
old guard of German philosophy in a struggle originated at the Prussian court in the
early 1740s and never completely brought to an end.34
This new approach in philosophy and science animates Meiners’ investigations on
human nature, according to him and to the cultural agenda of that time the main topic
of any philosophical inquiry. By identifying logic and psychology, he describes the
nature of the “soul” by means of the working of the “mind”, and he praises Charles
Bonnet for having introduced the physiological theory of nerve fibers in psychological
investigations. Priestley’s readaptation of Hartley’s physiology perfectly fits his own
aims, and he sees clearly the philosophical (and religious) implications of such an
approach:
Through this theory [i.e. the theory of vibrations] the powers of the soul and their operations
will all be transformed in mere properties and movements of matter: but this conclusion can
be frightening only for those, who ground their hope for the immortality of the soul exclu-
sively on its dubious immateriality. [On the contrary, Priestley] thinks it is more comprehen-
sible to conceive humans as composite beings made of an homogeneous mass, that they cease
to be right after death, with no other hope for a return to life except for the one offered by the
Revelation.35
Differently from Pistorius, in this review and in his general approach, Meiners doesn’t
need to find an excuse for such a materialistic psychology; he doesn’t seem to regret the
fact that this time, differently from what happened with Pistorius’ annotations, Hartley’s
work hasn’t ended up in “safe hands” capable of “domesticating” its dangerous contents
for the German audience.36 But this doesn’t seem to frighten Meiners at all, who goes
on in the description of the contents, without refraining from reproaching Priestley for
his questionable acquaintance with the history of philosophy, and even with Locke’s
theory of ideas.37 Meiner’s conclusive consideration concerning Hartley’s interesting
remarks on human nature and the hope for a broader circulation of his ideas by means
of the Priestley edition might be read as a suggestion to make the text available to the
German world with a new updated translation, or at least with a translation of the intro-
ductory essays that are in fact at the very center of Meiners’ discussion.
The translation and the edition of Priestley’s essays was completed just a couple of years
later by Meiners’ young colleague at the Georgia Augusta, Michael Hißmann (1752–1784),
who published it as “supplements to the German Hartley” in the first issue of the philo-
sophical journal he had just founded, the Magazin für Philosophie und ihre Geschichte.38
The importance of Priestley’s materialistic approach for Hißmann’s inquiry on human
nature can hardly be overstated, and seems to be the most investigated episode of Priest-
ley’s reception in Germany. His major work, the Psychologische Versuche – published
anonymously in 1777, while he was probably already working at the Priestley translation
– and the Briefe über Gegenstände der Philosophie from 1778, present clear traces of Priest-
ley’s presence and reveal in general a very close acquaintance with different models of the-
ories of the brain and of the physiological process at the basis of mental phenomena.39
Hißmann discusses extensively the opposition between Hartley’s theory of nerve vibration,
the “Newtonsche oder Hartleysche Hypothese”, and Albrecht von Haller’s theory of nerve
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spirits.40 The name of Priestley appears only twice in the Psychologische Versuche; in the
first occurrence, he is mentioned in connection with Hartley, of course, but also with Con-
dillac, Helvetius, Bonnet, Search, Robinet, and the German Lossius, as those “physiological
and anatomical psychologists” (physiologische und anatomische Psycholog[en]) who are
able to provide a theory of the soul suitable to its material nature.41 In the second, Priestley
finally reaches the top step of the podium. Leaving aside the opposition between the dusty
scene of German philosophy with its metaphysical psychologies, and the British avant-
garde of the mild or wild supporters of thinking matter, Priestley managed to bring mate-
rialism to its highest form: “whatHartleywas not willing to say out loud, even if it was fully
implicated in his system, was taught explicitly by Priestley in his new edition of Hartley’s
work”.42 Well before Buhle, Hißmann assigns Priestley a key role in providing a way out
from a paralyzed philosophical debate.
Like Priestley, Hißmann grounds the materialistic conclusion of his Versuche on the
idea that our mental capacities are tightly connected to the physical organization of the
brain, so that it is incoherent and in contrast to every empirical evidence to conceive
the soul as a simple, immaterial being. Nevertheless, neither for Priestley nor for
Hißmann does this assumption necessarily lead to irreligion or atheism, even though
for very different theoretical grounds. In fact, differently from Priestley, who claimed
that the soul is properly mortal in the sense that every mental activity ceases with the
death of the body, Hißmann argues that not all matter is necessarily destructible, and
God’s omnipotence might have endowed that very peculiar portion of matter both with
the capacity of thinking and with indestructibility. The soul might then be material and
still not die with the body.43 Even the subversion of morality, which was, beside
atheism, the second accusation materialism had been charged with at the time, was pre-
vented by Hißmann’s very refined analysis of inner sense, that is in the distinction
between the feeling of our existence and the feeling of personal identity, which shows a
clear Priestleyan echo.44 The “peculiar combination of faith and Materialism”, which,
according to Lange, “has kept its grounds in England down to our own days”,45 doesn’t
seem to be a British monopoly.
With Meiners and Hißmann, Göttingen unquestionably became the epicentre of the
dissemination of Priestley’s philosophical work in Germany. This fact was surely encour-
aged by the political situation of the Electorate of Hannover (since 1714 under the crown
of the United Kingdom), which had enabled a much more prolific exchange with British
trends in philosophy and science than in other parts of Germany, but first and foremost by
the progressive emergence of a firm opposition against the fruitless wandering of meta-
physics in favor of a naturalistic, empirical approach.46 The interest in British philosophy
had prepared the ground for the very precocious reception of Priestley, whose Examin-
ation of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, Dr. Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and
Immutability of Truth, and Dr. Oswald’s Appeal to Common Sense (1775) had been
very positively reviewed in the very same year of its publication by one of the leading
figures of the empirical orientation of the Georgia Augusta, Johann Georg Heinrich
Feder (1740–1821).47 Feder was not as radical as Meiners and Hißmann in metaphysics,
but he was a strong supporter of Locke’s philosophy; Priestley didn’t represent for him the
audacious inventor of a new viable materialistic path, as he did for his two colleagues, but
rather the one who finally raised his voice against Reid and the Scottish detractors of
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Locke’s philosophy, denouncing the dangerous inclination toward scepticism of their
appeal to common sense.48
The promotion of Priestley’s ideas continued even after the premature death of
Hißmann, his main “intellectual heir” on the German soil. Between 1799 and 1780,
Meiners engaged in a very prolific discussion of Priestley’s work on materialism and deter-
minism, which he conducted in a remarkable number of reviews in the Göttingische
Anzeige. Between February andMay 1779, he published an extensive discussion of theDis-
quisitions relating to Matter and Spirit and of the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity,49 fol-
lowed one year later by the review of A Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism, and
Philosophical Necessity in a correspondence between Price and Priestley.50 Meiners’ reviews
represent once again the sole access to Priestley’s work for non-English speaking Germans,
as an Auszug aus des Doktor Priestleys Abhandlung von der philosophischen Nothwendig-
keit would only be available for the German reader more than a decade later.51
The common denominator among Meiners’ detailed reviews is the serious consider-
ation given to Priestley’s frank declaration of materialism and fatalism, definitely not
something German philosophy was used to.52 Meiners’ attitude toward Priestley rests pri-
marily on the undeniable originality of some philosophical claims, among which he men-
tions of course the idea of active matter, the successful effort to explain thought and
sensations as results of a certain physical organization, the general benefit of materialism
in removing the contradictions of a dualistic conception of human nature, but also and
primarily Priestley’s insistence on the heterogeneity between human and divine nature,
and his more-or-less successful efforts to show that materialism, far from being a threat
for religion, provides a solid metaphysical support to the teachings of Revelation.
Meiners praises above all Priestley’s “well-intentioned efforts” (gutgemeinte Bemühun-
gen)53 in removing or mitigating the negative implications commonly ascribed to such
a philosophical orientation. Priestley proves in a persuasive way that materialism
doesn’t lead necessarily and straight to atheism and to the denial of any hope in the after-
life, as much as fatalistic determinism doesn’t lead necessarily and straight to the denial of
any moral responsibility in actions, of the coercive power of future rewards and punish-
ments, and above all of divine providence. As Meiners synthetizes in his review of the
(partial) correspondence between Priestley and Price on materialism and philosophical
necessity, fatalismmeans nothing but the belief in the fact that “in the most perfect totality
all is well; [we] live in the house of God where the supremely good being acts in us,
through us and for us”.54 Even in Meiners’ discussion, Priestley’s “main concern to
show the accordance of his opinion with the Holy Scriptures”55 turns out to be the
“added value” of his philosophical system. The (unusual) defense of natural and revealed
religion turns out to be, once again, Priestley’s access key to the German world.
3. A tolerant vindication: Priestley’s defence of religion
The doctrine of philosophical necessity and its compatibility with morals and divine pro-
vidence is at the center of another group of writings Meiners promptly discusses in the
Göttingische Anzeigen. Between August 1780 and June 1781, he wrote extensive reviews
of Priestley’s second Letter to Palmer in defence of the Illustrations of Philosophical Neces-
sity, and of a couple of polemical writings that allow him to take Priestley’s side – some-
times in a quite aggressive way – against his opponents: the Observations in Defence of the
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Liberty of Man as a Moral Agent, by John Palmer, and An Address to Dr. Priestley upon his
doctrine of Philosophical Necessity by Jacob Bryant.56
Meiners’ timely and sympathetic reviews of Priestley’s works – sometimes genuinely
dense and detailed philosophical essays – might have been at the origin of the intense
translation initiatives that took place between the 1780s and the 1790s, by means of
which Germany came into direct contact with Priestley’s ideas; or at least that is what
might have happened in the case of his very positive review of the Letters to a Philosophical
Unbeliever, which he published in theGöttingische Anzeigen in 1781, just one year after the
original publication of Priestley’s work.57 Starting from the following year, two different
translations came out in Germany: the first one was published in Leipzig in 1782 with
the title Joseph Priestley’s Briefe an einen philosophischen Zweifler in Beziehung auf
Hume’s Gespräche, das System der Natur, und ähnliche Schriften; the second one came
out – together with a remarkable set of annotations – between 1785 and 1787 in three
different issues of the Beyträge zur Beförderung des vernünftigen Denkens in der Religion
with the title Joseph Priestleys Briefe an einen philosophischen Unglaubigen, enthaltend eine
Prüfung der wichtigsten Einwürfe gegen die Lehren der natürlichen Religion, insonderheit
derjenigen, die in Humes Schriften enthalten sind. The divergence in the German versions
of Priestley’s term “unbeliever” suggests the different approach of the translators; and, in
fact, the first one stresses the philosophical nuance of the unbeliever as a skeptic, while the
second one focuses on its religious implications, so that Priestley’s polemical goal becomes
the Ungläubiger, the enemy of natural and revealed religion. It is not an accident that the
Beyträge zur Beförderung des vernünftigen Denkens in der Religion were edited by Johann
Heinrich Corrodi (1752–1793), a major representative of reformed theology in Zürich.
The first translation had the broader circulation. The anonymous translator presents
Priestley in the foreword as a real apologist for natural religion and equates him with
Hermann Samuel Reimarus and Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem, at the time the
main advocates of natural religion in Germany.58 According to their aim, “the letters
do not present general explanations of the truths of natural religion, but their defence
against the objections and the difficulties, which in the present situation are really
urgent, or which are raised at most by their opponents”.59 The anonymous translator
agrees with Meiners’ opinion in the review of the original English text, in which he
claimed that, because of the closeness to Locke’s methodological caveat, Priestley
prefers to avoid the vain pursuit of irrefutable demonstrations in case the subject of the
investigation doesn’t allow that kind of certainty; in accordance with the acceptance of
the boundaries of human insight, he rather suggests to settle for the highest degree of prob-
ability. Such a methodological claim drives Priestley’s investigation of the truths of natural
religion, such as the proof of God’s existence, and our hope for a future life.60 According to
the translator, Priestley’s ability to develop his inquiry by showing the likeliness of his
statements and the unlikeliness of the related criticisms was a very successful way to
drive the reader to his conclusions through a free examination. And here lies the
ground of the urgency of a German translation: the way Priestley deals with topics that
were commonly considered incompatible with his fundamental materialism and deter-
minism shows that the freedom of thought cannot be dangerous by itself.61 His work is
“an illuminating proof of the advantages of the undisturbed freedom of thought, and an
instructive caveat against the zeal of a most fearful concern about the influence of some
particular speculative doctrines”.62 Focusing on Priestley’s methodological approach – a
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successful combination of epistemic modesty (priority of probability on certainty in reli-
gious claims) and a concrete exercise of the freedom of thought (according to the idea that
“free discussion must always be favourable to the cause of truth”63) – the translator pre-
sents to the German world the basis of an apologetic program of rational Christianity that
properly fits the attempts of a religious reform undertaken during the late German
Enlightenment. For obvious reasons, Priestley’s apologetic claim found very warm
approval within the milieu of the promoters of any form of natural religion – from the
more-or-less radically oriented “deists” in Berlin to “new” Kantian supporters of a
“pure rational faith” – all unanimously against the claims of an omnipersuasive deductive
reason, able to grasp by its own means the deepest truths of revelation. Priestley was per-
ceived as the successful opponent of what Kant in those same years was (half) praising as
the German Geist der Gründlichkeit; a topic mentioned in the preface to Priestley’s trans-
lation,64 which suddenly became central in the first reception of the work.
This translation was promptly reviewed in Germany and mentioned in the canonical
histories of philosophy such as Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philoso-
phie.65 In 1784, it was reviewed by J.C.F. Baumann, together with the German trans-
lation of Priestley’s Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion, in the Kurze
Nachrichten der Allgemeinen Deutschen Bibliothek.66 The reviewer of course praises
“the brilliance of the author and his warm zeal for the venerable and most beneficent
truths on which are based human rest, happiness and hope”;67 but, in addition, he com-
plains bitterly about Priestley’s renouncing the possibility of reaching a high degree of
certainty in theological and metaphysical speculations, and remaining at the level of
mere probability. The reason for such a complaint reveals the closeness of the reviewer
to the conservative national front of German philosophy: Priestley’s approach is judged
to be too weak to provide an efficacious antidote against Hume’s skepticism or against
the immoral and atheistic Système de la nature, which Priestley himself had named the
“Bible of atheism”. Too weak because of its lack of thoroughness. The proper cure for
those who suffer from such a philosophical perversion can only be found in the purest
German tradition, in “German philosophy and especially in the acquaintance with the
Leibnizian school. Platner and Eberhard, for instance, will illuminate them where
Priestley abandoned them”.68 This is the “benefit of the German philosophical thor-
oughness”.69 Priestley embodies the limits of the naturalistic, observative approach,
which needs to be integrated by a higher deductive knowledge in conformity with
the teachings of the noblest “national” philosophical tradition, i.e. with the connubium
rationis et experientiae of the (Leibnizo-)Wolffian school. The progressive empiricist
wave of Göttingen and its distrustful look at metaphysics didn’t spread across all of
Germany.
But even in his more conservative milieu, in the strongholds of the national philosophi-
cal spirit, the reviewer was well disposed to recognize Priestley’s talent in presenting reli-
gious doctrines in an easy and complete way and with a noble warm tone; a talent almost
unknown to most German theologians.70 Instead of the fearful concern about the potential
danger of the opinions of the unbelievers, the advocates of religion should take advantage
from them in order to reach a better, rational justification of the truths usually accepted on
the basis of “faithfulness and faith” (Treue und Glaube).71 This is exactly the way that led
to the birth of Christian religion from pagan worship, and that should drive its purification
from the current corruptions. Insisting on a topic that was at the center of the then-current
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discussion on the “pluralistic” nature of every pursuit of truth,72 the reviewer notes the
positive role of the unbelievers who allow religion to follow the same path of natural
sciences toward reliable knowledge:
Thus it seems that the writings and speeches of the unbelievers of our age will undermine the
foundations of the papal falsifications of Christianity, and will pave the way for the establish-
ment of pure religion. […] [Christianity] will reach such a fixed immutable character of truth,
which it could never have reached without the opposition it has found. This was the fate of
every part of true philosophy, of the Copernican system, of the Newtonian theory of light and
color, and of Franklin’s theory of electricity!73
The corruptions of Christianity were a typical Priestleyan topic. In 1782, Priestley had
published aHistory of the Corruptions of Christianity, which became a highly controversial
book for its attacks on the key teachings of the Christian doctrine, among which the
Trinity, predestination, original sin, and atonement. The long, difficult personal process
that brought him from Calvinism to Unitarianism74 led him to see in the doctrine of
the Trinity the greatest corruption of the original message; a corruption that he explained
on the basis of his materialistic and deterministic orientation in philosophy. According to
Priestley, in fact, the Holy Scriptures do not present a single element which could prove the
divine nature of Christ, or the belief that the immateriality of the soul has to be essential to
the belief in the afterlife. Those doctrines are, rather, the outcome of some ancient pagan
influence that falsified the original message of Christianity.75 As philosophy supports
natural and revealed religion, rational Christianity – i.e. Christianity purified from its fal-
sifications – is in accordance with the doctrines of philosophical necessity and
materialism.76
Key to his advocacy of these last, however, is the removal of false views and ancient preju-
dices: the association with ancient fatalism and modern Calvinism in the case of the
former, and the deeply held view that matter of its nature is passive, inert, and impenetrable
in the case of the latter. Matter’s supposed possession of these properties rendered it ineligible
as a subject that could think or perceive.77
The German reaction toward Priestley’s radical attack on some of the cornerstones of
Revealed religion was prompt, but not univocal. German theologians had already dis-
cussed extensively some of Priestley’s early works, as well as his project of a Theological
Repository.78 In 1785, Johann Christoph Rudolph Eckermann, an evangelical theologian
who had been a student of Feder in Göttingen, published a two-volume translation of
Priestley’s controversial book with the title Geschichte der Verfälschungen des Chris-
tenthums.79 The very flattering comparison with Reimarus and Jerusalem introduced by
the translator of the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever is now repeated by Eckermann
with the very polemical goal of putting Priestley in the same corner as the German
apologists for reason.80 By using similar “false grounds and artificial reasoning”,81 Priest-
ley shares the same ideas of the German “enemies of the evangelic doctrine”,82 who –
according to Eckermann – are at the end deists, Socinians, and antitrinitarians. The
same negative judgment on Priestley’s Geschichte was expressed in the review of the
work that appeared in the same year in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, in which
the reviewer reproaches Priestley for his Ungründlichkeit und Leichtigkeit, which could
be tolerated among the French, but not among the British.83
156 P. RUMORE
Beside these harsh attacks – dissonant voices in the chorus of appreciations for Priest-
ley’s attitude toward religion – the more moderate wing of German theology encouraged
the circulation of Priestley’s work in order to promote the defense of natural religion that
still, in the mid-1780s, was perceived as an urgent goal against the threat of atheism and
heresy. In 1786, the Lutheran pastor Hermann Andreas Pistorius – who, as mentioned
above, had already promoted and annotated the translation of Hartley’s Betrachtungen
über den Menschen more than a decade earlier – wrote a preface to Priestley’s Liturgie
und Gebetsformeln zum öffentlichen Gottesdienst für Christen von allen Confessionen,
the German translation of the Forms of Prayer and Other Offices of 1783. Priestley’s
work – originally meant for the use of Unitarian societies, and therefore slightly
modified in the translation – is here presented as a useful example of a common
liturgy for every Christian church, and most and foremost as an antidote to the unbelief
that made Berlin most notorious inside and outside Germany.84 According to Pistorius,
the defense of religion can be carried on even looking at those authors such as Priestley,
and Hartley beside him, who show that England does not produce only deism and free
thinking, but also pure Christian apologists, animated by the sole pursuit of truth. In Pis-
torius’ preface, Priestley’s attempt to provide a common subset of rituals in the public
worship of Christianity is welcomed as a successful means to preserving the integrity
of Christianity and its fundamental truths against its enemies.85 Such an attempt
would bring undeniable advantages for religion, among which Pistorius mentions in
the first place one of the Kampfideen of that time, i.e. the idea of tolerance; an idea
that was very familiar to Priestley from the times of his education in the dissenting
Academy in Daventry, and later developed, with some Lockean echoes, in his Essay
on the First Principles of Government (1768). Priestley’s Liturgie becomes, in Pistorius’
eyes, the occasion to promote the same ideal of a “Reasonable tolerance and true com-
patibility” (vernünftige Toleranz und wahre Verträglichkeit)86 among the different
churches and doctrines. This kind of tolerance shouldn’t be pursued by the governors
as a mere instrument of their political projects, for it is grounded in the unquestionable
right of every human being; the
reasonable compatibility among the dissenters should be based only upon the mutual con-
viction that religious faith is an inalienable property of each human being, over which
only his own conscience and God can exercise some right […] faith and theoretical opinions
in religion concern the state and the authorities only in so far as those beliefs and theories of
religion could turn their supporters into bad citizens.87
By stressing both the cultural and civil implications of Priestley’s program of a “tolerant
vindication” of religious dissent, Pistorius was in fact insisting on the importance of such
an “enlightened” approach in religious and philosophical matters for the political situation
in Germany. The imminent death of Frederick the Great (August 1786) would have made
such a teaching even more urgent.
What comes out, almost unexpected, in the German reception of Priestley is the posi-
tive aura that surrounds his name both in the philosophical and in the theological milieu.
Of course, Priestley also finds critics and opponents in Germany, who attack some core
theses of his philosophical system (his moral determinism, like Kant, his physiology of
representation, like Tetens; just to mention two famous episodes) and his theological
inquiries (in primis, his denial of the divine nature of Christ). However, differently than
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elsewhere and differently from many other “materialists” that were recognized as such (La
Mettrie, Holbach, Helvetius), Germany never seemed to have looked at him as at “the
devil incarnate”.88 On the contrary, both his philosophical and theological works seem to
have played a very pivotal role in the promotion of some central ideas of the German Enlight-
enment. Priestley managed to defend with solid rational arguments the perfect compatibility
between the methods of natural science and the investigation of human nature. By means of
his “agreeable materialism” and the related doctrine of moral necessity – both of which he
“rehabilitated” as dignified philosophical opinions – he proved and presented in the most
intelligible way, he managed to revitalize a debate which, at least in Germany, had reached
a dead end. He brought to light the contradictions involved in dualistic metaphysics and
the illusory theory of free will, without denying the validity of religion, both in its natural
and revealed components. In Germany, Priestley was not simply considered a model in
the clarity of the exposition, but also a remarkable example of cultural and religious tolerance.
His campaign for the freedom of thought and the senselessness of fearful prejudiced opinions
in speculative and religious matter represent his main contribution to the German intellectual
world, even beyond the single episodes of contaminations strictly connected to the trans-
mission of particular ideas or speculative items.
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38-41: 39-40.
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77. Dybikowski, “Joseph Priestley, Metaphysician and Philosopher of Religion”.
78. The Theological Repository (1769–1771) was discussed by the Lutheran theologian Gottfried
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and 1774 (May 1771): 460.462; 71 (June 1772): 602–6; 44 (April 1744): 372–6). Less is also
the author of the reviews of Priestley’s A free Address to Protestant Dissenters on the Subject of
the Lord’s Supper (1768), Göttingische Anzeigen 133 (1769): 1203–5, and of the second edition
of A view of the principles and conduct of the Protestant-Dissenters with respect to the civil and
ecclesistic Constitution of England (1769), Göttingische Anzeigen 142 (1770): 1244–7. A very
enthusiastic discussion of Priestley’s An Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Chris-
tianity was published by Johann D. Michaelis in 1772 in the Göttingische Anzeigen 69 (June
1772): 587–91).
79. Priestley, Geschichte der Verfälschungen des Christenthums was published in the same year in
Hamburg-Kiel (Bohn) and in Berlin (Siegismund Friedrich Hesse).
80. Ibid., V–VI. Eckermann’s reference to the Apologie der Vernunft might be to Carl Friedrich
Bahrdt, who had published a book with that title in 1781, but also to Reimarus’ Apologie oder
Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes, published by Lessing with the title Frag-
mente eines Ungenannten (1774–1778), and to Jerusalem’s Vornehmsten Wahrheiten der
Christlichen Religion (17763, 1768). Cf. Pockrandt, Biblische Aufklärung, 222. On Bahrdt,
447–59.
81. Ibid., XXVI.
82. Ibid., VI.
83. Cf. Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung 194 (August 1785): 189–92, and 210 (Sept. 1785): 271.
84. Pistorius, preface to Priestley’s Liturgie und Gebetsformeln zum öffentlichen Gottesdienst für
Christen von allen Confessionen, the German translation of the Forms of Prayer and Other
Offices, XLIII.
85. Ibid., XXVII.
86. Ibid., XXXI.
87. Ibid., XXXI–XXXII.
88. This expression is used by David L. Wykes in a useful description of the reactions to Priest-
ley’s History of Corruptions: “In 1782 Priestley published his History of the Corruptions of
Christianity. It was perhaps his most controversial and influential book. Priestley attacked
the principal elements of the Christian doctrine: the Trinity, predestination, and atonement,
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